Player Development - Part 1: Productive farm system allows Sox flexibility

At the time of his introduction as general manager in 2002, Theo Epstein offered a vision of a Red Sox "scouting and player development machine." He made clear that the team would commit to the creation of a productive farm system that would feed a steady flow of prospects to the majors.

It is one thing to articulate such a blueprint, quite another to stick to it. Many general managers have announced similar intentions, but their principles wavered when confronted with an opportunity to reshape their major-league roster.

The Sox faced precisely such a crossroads this offseason in the person of Johan Santana. The Twins, faced with the prospect of losing their two-time Cy Young winner as a free agent following the 2008 season, made available a pitcher who has been baseball's best over the past four years.

From 2004-07, Santana claimed pitching's triple crown, leading all starters (minimum: 162 innings per year) in wins (70), strikeouts (983) and ERA (2.89). Moreover, the pitcher--who turned 29 this month--ranked among the most durable in baseball, having led the American League with an average of 228 innings a season.

Santana's credentials were impeccable. The Sox, fueled by visions of a dynasty anchored by Santana and incumbent ace Josh Beckett, found the prospect of acquiring him in a trade undeniably compelling.

An organization that won the 2007 World Series in no small part on the strength of players who were drafted and developed by the Red Sox faced a dilemma. Even as the franchise emphasized the importance of its home-grown products, it could not stay out of the sweepstakes.

"We repeat how committed we are to scouting and player development to remind ourselves. If you don't repeat it enough, it's so easy to forget it, and to do things that benefit you more for the short term than the long haul," said Epstein. "We don't buy into that dogma at the expense of sound decision-making for the good of the organization.

"There are players who are good enough, impactful enough, that we should be aggressively trading prospects to acquire them," he continued. "To my mind, Santana was one of those players."

The team presented two packages to the Twins. One featured dynamic outfielder Jacoby Ellsbury along with pitching prospect Justin Masterson and shortstop Jed Lowrie, all viewed as future big-league contributors. Another offer centered on starter Jon Lester, who was substituted along with centerfielder Coco Crisp for Ellsbury.

(Later, when the Twins sought final offers in late January, the Sox tweaked the secondary components of their offer, but until the end, packages remained on the table that included Lester and Ellsbury.)

The Twins asked for more. The Sox drew a line in the sand, and ultimately remained on the sidelines when Santana was traded to the Mets for four prospects.

"We'd give up two or three really good prospects, but not a whole generation, not something that would strip our farm system," said Epstein. "We gave them two strong offers. We winced. But it still would have left us in a strong position.

"They did make us an offer that, had we accepted it, we would have made the trade. But that particular offer, the asking price for us, to my mind, would have been sacrificing not just one or two young players but a whole generation of talent. It would have left us worse off as an organization than if we'd not made the trade."

That decision will no doubt be scrutinized for years to come. Yet in many respects, the fact that the Sox did not make the deal is less significant than the fact that they could have made the deal.

Talent pool drained

When John Henry, Tom Werner and Larry Lucchino bought the Sox in 2002, the talent pool had been completely drained. Baseball America considered pitcher Seung Song, first baseman Tony Blanco and pitcher Rene Miniel the team's top three prospects. (Of that illustrious trio, only Blanco reached the bigs for a 62 at-bat splat of a cameo.)

No longer. The farm system is now considered elite, capable of producing a steady stream of impact big leaguers who can follow a now well-traveled path that has already been taken by Jonathan Papelbon, Manny Delcarmen, Dustin Pedroia, Ellsbury and Clay Buchholz.

The possibility of acquiring Santana merely highlighted the extraordinary turnaround. The proposal featuring Ellsbury, Lowrie and Masterson is in some respects staggering.

Both Ellsbury and Lowrie were first-round selections in the 2005 draft, while Masterson was a second-rounder in 2006. The Sox believed they had a legitimate shot to acquire the best pitcher in baseball by using a trio of players, each with fewer than three years of pro experience, as chips.

"It shows how much better we've been drafting -- so much better than in the past," said Kevin Youkilis, who was drafted by the Sox in 2001. "A big thing is that a lot of them can get traded. Before, there wasn't a lot of guys who could be traded. Now, there are a lot from Triple-A down to A-ball who can be traded."

Moreover, the Sox feel confident that they now have systems in place to maintain the talent flow of both trade chips and players who will contribute in Boston. Though they declined to export the so-called "generation of talent" to the Twins, they were willing to part with three or four very good to elite prospects without emptying the minors.

"We had a comfort level that, if it had happened, that we had the systems in place -- in domestic amateur scouting, in international scouting -- that we could give ourselves a chance to replace that talent," said Red Sox V.P. of Player Personnel Ben Cherington. "Maybe not tomorrow or immediately, but in time. That was a comfort level.

"On the other side of the coin," continued Cherington, "there was a comfort level that if it didn't happen, that we were in good position with the young players that we had. Along with the veteran players, they would give us a chance to be successful, to be competitive in the coming years."

Attention to detail

The fact that the Sox now find themselves in a position of unquestioned strength represents an unquestioned organizational triumph. Even rival talent evaluators routinely offer plaudits to the work done by the Sox in turning one of baseball's worst farm systems into one of its best.

Yankees general manager Brian Cashman has often cited the success of the Sox' player development system as a model worthy of emulation in the Bronx. An American League scout may have best summed up the work and perception of the Sox this spring when asked to describe how the team has achieved its transformation.

"They leave no stone unturned," the scout said. "They leave nothing to chance."

The Sox have been meticulous in their efforts to create a minor-league system that sustains World Series ambitions. Despite offering the expected disclaimers that potential is no guarantee of success for the current wealth of prospects, even Sox officials admit some shock at the speed of their accomplishments.

"We were confident that with time and resources committed to scouting and player development that we could improve the farm system," said Epstein. "I'm not sure that we would have what's being called the second best farm system five years into it."

The general manager attributed the startling turnaround to three elements: the scouts who identified the right players, the player development system that prepared them to blitz through the system and the major-league coaches and players who created an environment in which prospects could succeed.

"Without any of those three links in the chain," said Epstein, "this wouldn't have happened."

Now, the organization is ready to bet that its success in years to come on the sustained fit of those areas. The scouting and player development machine--once merely a motto--is now, in Cherington's words, "a living, breathing entity."

Alex Speier covers the Red Sox for the New Hampshire Union Leader and Sunday News.